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PREFACE
The November issue of the Gaiko Jiho, the leading monthly magazine devoted to world affairs, contains
an article on the Lytton Report by Mr Chokiuro
Kadono. I found it very interesting, so I · at once
wrote the eminent writer for his permission to have
it translated for inclusion in the Herald of Asia Library
of Contemporary History series. The return post
brought me not only Mr. Kadono's kind accession to
my request but, what was most welcome, a typed
copy of the original text in English written by himself.
The result is the present volume forming the eleventh
of the series.
Mr. C. Kadono as a writer is probably new to
the foreign public, though this IS by no means the first
time that enlightening productions of his well stored
mind have embellished the pages of our periodical
press. Of course he is well known to a large circle
of his friends and acquaintances in Europe and America
as one of the leading figures in the business world of
Japan, as the right hand man to the late Baron
Kihachiro- Okura and as the surviving pillar of the
well-known firm of Okura & Partners with world-wide
ramifications. Responsible for vast· interests in China
and Manchuria in addition to those in. Japan, Mr.
Kadono, a highly cultured man, has made an intimate
study of the continental affairs from various angles.
His views and suggestions are, consequently, widely
sought after not only by men interested in industrial
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and economic enterprises on the continent, but by men
of affairs in general.
His present contribution to the discussion of the
Report submitted to the League of Nations by the
Lytton Commission, will be found worthy of attention
for more than one reason. What he says on the
industrial r~urces of Manchuria, for instance, commands attention, because it is based on his own personal ·
knowledge and experience ; nor is his testimony less
important when he discusses the popular Chinese
attitude toward Manchukuo, because he commands a
wide range of information regarding China and Chinese.
But to me the most interesting part of his discourse
is his analysis and description of the course of Chinese
political history since the Revolution of 1912. No
doubt one of the most important cause of the chaotic
conditions in China during the past twenty years, was the ease with which the revolution was accomplished.
The fact is that the imperial regime of the Ching
Dynasty was like an edifice eaten by white ants ; it
was ready to crumble down at the touch of a finger,
as it actually did without any fighting worthy of the
name on the part of the revolutionists. The ease with
which the change took place was in fact a surprise to
the revolutionists themselves. The result was that the
revolutionary movement had not had time and opportunity to develop a sufficient group of strong and
unselfish leaders to undertake the task of reconstruction
such as the long and sanguinary movement culminating
in the Restoration of 1868 had produced in Japan.
The inevitable result, as correctly pointed out by
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Mr. Kadono, was that China was delivered over to the
tender mercy of unprincipled and self-aggrandizing
warlords and politicians who have given no chance to
their unfortunate victims to make any effective move
towards progress and unification. Unfortunately, therefore, I have to agree with Mr. Kadono in believing
that the Chinese will have to cover a long distance yet
to come in sight of a real national rehabilitation. In
the meanwhile the chronic malady eating into the very
vitals of China, constitutes a perpetual menance to
security and peaceful progress in the Far East. The
danger spot is not in Manchuria, but in China itself.
It is a pity that the League is only busying itself with
the consequences of a local and incidental manifestation
of the disease instead of treating it · at its source.
MOTOSADA ZUMOTO

Tokyo, December, 1932.

A BUSINESSMAN'S VIEW OF THE
LYTTON- REPORT
1. Introduction

I feel profound respect for the great pains which
the League of Nations Commission of Enquiry headed
by Lord Lytton took to fulfill the important mission
_;with which it was entrusted. It conducted for a period
-0f nearly half a year a survey of conditions in China
and Manchuria and investigated the causes of the disputes in the Far East. I regret, however, to have
to say that I find it difficult to agree with the result
of its study as p~esented in the Report submitted to
the League.
2. Japan's Chinese Policy

One of the chief _prerequisites to a fruitful study of
the Far Eastern disputes, is to attain a clear conception of the Japanese policy in China. It is hardly an
exaggeration to say that Japan's foreign policy during
the past half century has consisted in the maintenance
of peace in the Far East and the open door in China
with a view to ultimate progress and advancement of
the peoples of Eastern Asia. It was with this basic
aim in view or as steps to its attainment that the
Anglo-Japanese alliance and other political treaties con.ceming the Far East have been concluded, and it was
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also to the same end that we have had to fight a
succession of sanguinary wars. What we have all along
expected of China; was that she would achieve progress and stability so as to be able to offer a wholehearted cooperation with us in maintaining peace and
order in the Far East. It is scarcely necessary to
emphasise the fact that Japan has always been most
heartily in sympathy with China's peaceful development ; nor has she ever refused to do her share in
upholding it, as abundantly proved by historical incidents. There is, therefore, no reason whatever that
Japan should apply any pressure upon China that might
tend to prejudice China's free development ; nor has
there ever been any such attempt on Japan's part.
3. China's Characteristics

I shall next try to make a brief analysis of China's
characteristic political development. China covers a
vast area of the earth's surface and has developed a
unique civilisation which has lasted several thousand
years. But its political history is made up of a succession of dynastic revolutions, each dynasty being set up
as a sort of a family concern by a successful soldier who
simply imposed himself upon the people as sovereign
at the point of the sword. Another significant fact to
be remembered is that the vast extent of territory
designated as China on the map of Asia, has never
been unified during all these thousands of years, except
on a few occasions and then only for very short
periods. The people of China, consequently, have
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always lacked the consciousness of a united political
entity. Nor is there any record in her history of a
Government that ever succeeded in extending its administrative authority to the four comers of its dominion.
Look, for instance, at the Ching Dynasty, which forms
one of the brightest epochs in the political history of
China. Even under that dynasty, especially during
the latter days of its existence, its imperial family only
maintained its dignity by inertia owing to its initial
vigour, the actual governmental authority being exercised by Provincial authorities, civil and military,
. according to the traditional practice and usage of each
locality. As for the people at large, owing to continuous exploitation by those in authority and in consequence of a political philosophy peculiar to China,
they have developed, except those aspiring to official
careers, a feeling of repugnance to politics and a
habitual tendency to try to keep official interference at
arm's length. The inevitable result has been the
emergence of a strong type of individualism which
relies only upon self protection. This spirit of self
reliance unites the household, and spreading through
the family ramifications to the village at large, it has
led to the growth of a strong spirit of communal
solidarity. The Chinese people, therefore, look upon
the governmental machinery as a device for exploitation by the emperor and his officials. Their idea of
country is limited to a communal consciousness circumscribed within the confines of a province. There
are, it is true, references in Chinese literature to China
as a country and a nation, but the Chinese people as
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a whole are conspicuously innocent of a national consciousness in the true sense of the term or of the
power to unite for national purposes.
4. The Significance of the Chinese Revolution

From what has been said, it will have been noticed
how difficult it is for other nationals to understand
her history, her national conditions and characteristics.
To make it still worse, the revolution of 1912 spread
the seeds of confusion all over the country. Up to
that moment, the Imperial dynasty of Ching, though
owing its existence to historical inertia, was still an
object of respect throughout the country. Then the
revolution took place all of a sudden. Started through
an accidental cause, it did not rest upon a widespread
understanding among the people ; nor was it accomplished according to a plan consciously worked out by
an organised political body. The men who were known
at the time as revolutinaries were simply men opposed
to the Manchu Dynasty. There were not among them
any man of calibre equal to the task of building up a
new revolutionary state. So the only thing they could
do was to turn over the whole responsibility of government to Yuan Shin-kai, the strongest surviving
military chieftain of the overturned regime. And what
did Yuan Shih-kai do ? Instead of devoting his energy
to the attainment of national unity and reconstruction,
he made it his aim to perpetuate his authority and
power by purchasing the support of the leading militarists in the Provinces by bribery of ope form or
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another. The inevitable result was that Yuan's selfish
policy tended to encourage a growing attitude of
independence and arrogance on the part of the provincial war-lords. The latter not only beg_an to nurse
aspirations for power on a wider stage, but by continued strife and competition among themselves, they
incidentally helped to undermine the prestige of the
Central Government. It was in this way that for a
period of about twelve years after the Revolution
China was torn into a number of warring sections each
striving to gain . control of the Central Government.
The conditions in China thus clearly showed that she
was not qualified as a united nation. But this fact
was not well known to the world when the Washington
Conference was held in 1922. In any event that conference did not take cognizance of this fact, and it
seems to have proceeded on the assumption that China's
unification and recovery would be attained in good
time.
5. Since the Nationalist Revolution

During this period, however, it is only fair to observe
that it was usual for the rival contestants for power
to try to justify their military activities by reference
to questions connected with the successive constitutional
enactments or national assemblies. The internecine
strifes, at least seemingly, turned round certain central
points and along recognised orbits. All this was changed
by Feng Yu-hsiang's coup d'etat in 1924, when the
Central Government was overturned and with it went
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all the constitutional statutes. Thus was ushered in a
new period of internal confusion, characterised by wars
which were openly waged for personal aggrandizement
without any attempt at justifying them by reference
to the authority of law or ordinance. The result was
that the civil strife now became multi-angled, the
military chiefs in the various parts of the country
being now occupied in extending their own individual
power by means of increased armament and arts of
popular enchantment. The Central Government at
Peking more than once went out of existence both in
name and substance. The tragedy was then by no
means uncommon of Presidents, Prime Ministers and
Chief Executives flying from Peking with bare life to
take refuge at Tientsin. At this juncture, the Kuomintang, which had long been nursing its strength in the
South, began to march its well trained army into the
Yangtze basin with the new slogan of the nationalist
revolution. After subduing Middle China, the Kuomintang forces extended its sway even to North China,
resulting in the establishment of the Kuomintang Government at Nanking in 1928. So far as appearances
went, it looked for a time as though the ·principle of
government by the party had won the day, with a
united China at last a reality.
6. China's Revolutionary Diplomacy

The China that thus emerged out of the Kuomintang victory, was essentially different from the China
that existed at the time of the Washington Conference
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in 1922. All the national covenants regulating the
organic system of the country had been blotted out of
existence, together with all the traditions of discipline
which constitute the fountain source of national power
and authority. · The Kuomintang and its army, supported by sheer force, intimidation and propaganda, were
the master of China. It was, indeed, an epochmaking
transformation. Moreover, the Kuomintang had already
adopted the policy embodied in the slogans of " embracing communism" and" allying with Soviet Russia," and
accepted from the latter not only the supply of funds
and advisers but guiding principles. In military strategy
and political workmanship, the Kuomintang followed
all the procedures of communist revolution. At home,
for instance, it confiscated land, property, and industry,
while abroad it tried to carry ·out the so-called revolutionary diplomacy, giving emphasis to the slogan of
" down with imperialism and unequal treaties." The
first Power to feel the brunt of the policy of revolu~
tionary diplomacy was Great Britain with a long and
glorious record in China. It is still fresh in the memory
of the world that Great Britain had to despatch to
Shanghai an army of 15,000 men for the protection of
her rights and prestige.
7. Treaty Repudiation and Closed Door

Let us now consider the real nature of the revolutionary diplomacy. You may perhaps look upon the
slogan of " down with imperialism and unequal
treaties" as'an expression of the awaking national con-
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sciousness of the Chinese people. It is, however,
important to bear in mind that this is nothing but a
cry for the world revolution backed by the Third
International. In other words it is the guiding principle
of the _Kuomintang to carry out a one-sided renunciation of international treaties, to take away by revolutionary methods the position and rights legitimately
acquired by the foreign Powers and their nationals in
China, and finally to shut the door against the world.
The Kuomintang apparently believe that in carrying
out such a policy they prove themselves loyal believers
in Su~ Yat-sen's principles of "embracing communism " and "allying with Soviet Russia." In
carrying out the anti-foreign tactics mentioned above,
the Kuomintang did not apply it against all the Powers
at the same time. Following the policy of " divide
and govern," it first applied it against Great Britain,
as already mentioned, and the next Power to suffer has
been Japan. Now it must be remembered that the
existing treaties and the special political and economic
relations between China and the Powers, have all been
legitimately established during the past eighty years
in view of the special conditions in China · and of
special international incidents. They have all these long
years been legally and smoothly applied, to the mutual
advantage of both sides. There is, therefore, no
justification, in spite of whatever changes may have
intervened in China's political situation, for unilateral
and revolutionary repudiation of these treaties and and
agreements. · Should such drastic and illegal measures
be suffered to pass, the result would mean the over-
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turning of the very foundation of international relations
and an ipcalculable menace to the peace of the world.
Japan has, consequently, endeavoured with great
patience and sacrifices to induce China to return to a
normal international policy, so that the sanctity of
international treaties may be maintained and peace
secured in the Far East. In particular Japan·has done
much to uphold the open door in China and prevent
her sovietization.
·
8. Boycott as an International War
But the ruling class in China has not only stoutly
refused to appreciate Japan's sincerity but has intensified
the vigour of its revolutionary diplomacy by carrying
out a violent boycott against us. Boycotts in Europe
and America do not usually overstep the limits and
needs of economic competition. But the anti ..Japanese
boycott as practised in China is essentially a mode of
international warfare. It is as such that its execution
is instigated, planned and enforced by the ruling class
in China. In the name of boycott .vast quantities
of Japanese goods have been forcibly seized or burnt
in open defiance of law and treaty. All business
dealings with the Japanese were prohibited by compulsion to the extent of cutting off the supply of daily
necessaries of life to the Japanese residents. As for
the Chinese dealing in Japanese merchandise, they were •
subject to most cruel and degrading forms of
lynching. Lastly the severance of all economic relations with Japan was proclaimed by the sponsors of
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the boycott, ·whose declared object was thereby to
starve and bankrupt the Japanese nation. It was
clearly tantamount not only to a declaration of war
upon Japan but to the actual prosecution of warlike
acts. The only difference from actual warfare was the
absence of firing by armed forces. All this while
Japan never offered armed resistance. The great
patience Japan has shown in this· connection, in spite
of the incaluculable damage inflicted upon her trade
and industry, finds few precedents in the long history
of international intercourse.

9.

Lytton Report Lacking in Factual
Understanding

In this way China succeeded in embittering the relation between her and Japan, and ·in setting the stage
ready for complications in the Far East. It was, we
must remember, with such a situation for its background, that the September 18th incident of last year
took place, leading to the dispute now engaging the
the attention of the League of Nations. In the light
of these historical facts, it is a source of deep regret
to me that the Lytton Report reveals singular defects
of understanding concerning the peculiar characteristics
of China's historical development as well as the realities
of her present condition. Equally regrettable is the
• Commission's failure to investigate the actual status of
the present relations between Japan and China, which
has naturally made 'them contented with a horizontal
view of the whole problem; thoughtlessly placing the
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two parties to the dispute on the same plane. Had the
commission taken the trouble to familiarise themselves
with a vertical view of China, such as I have tried to
present, their Report would have been free from the
partiality and inconsistencies that unfortunately disfigure its pages; nor would their conclusions have been
so far apart from the realities _of the case as to invite
the criticism that they are an idle talk incapable of
practical application. Apart from these general observations on the Lytton Report, I do not feel it necessary
for me to attempt detailed examination chapter by
chapter.
To make the long story short, China's conditions,
as pointed out so far, have changed in character all
along the line since the time when the Nine Power
Treaty was concluded. China is no longer an organised
state ruled by a single government. With no constitutional laws to base government upon and with no
machinery to enact such laws, China's so-called national
government is a despotic administration by one party,
deriving its power and sanction from force and propaganda as well as from the private activities of its
party organizations. As it is, its authority is confined
within the borders of a few Provinces in Central China.
In the North and the South, there are separate governments that do not acknowledge allegiance to the
Central Government. Of late, moreover, there are
signs of fresh political complications in different parts
of the country. All this seems to point to the fact
that China's unification is not yet in sight.. Time
certainly does not seem near at hand, when, freed
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from recurrent internecine strife, China will be able to
qualify as an organized state capable of discharging
her international obligations and doing her share in the
work of promoting peace and progress in the world.
10. Manchuria as a World Market

I shall now say a word about the Manchurian question. The Lytton Report, it seems to me, is open to
criticism on three points; namely, (1) that it shows a
lack of right understanding concerning the outbreak
of the Manchurian trouble; (2) that it errs in its
judgment on the closeness of Japan's relations with
Manchuria ; and (3) that it is defective in its study of
the economic value of Manchuria.
I do not consider it necessary for me to enter at
any length upon the history of the Jananese-Manchurian relations or upon the origin and nature of the
present Manchurian affair. It may not, however, be
out of place for me to offer a remark or two upon
the prospect of economic development in Manchuria,
as I have had considerable personal experience in this
field together with my late senior partner, Baron Kihachiro Okura, who made no small contribution to the
development of industry not only in Manchuria but in
China proper. It is a well known fact that, thanks to
the assistance of the Japanese people and also due to
the maintenance of the policy of the open door by
Japan, Manchuria has already made a wonderful
progress in the development of its economic resources.
There are good reasons to feel confident that Man-

-
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churia's industrial progress will be something prodigeous. Take, for instance, the future prospect of the
two basic industries of coal and iron, to which the
Lytton Report makes a reference (Chapter VIII). There
are enormous coal deposits in Manchuria, especially
at Fushun and Hsinchiu. The quantity of the Manchurian coal exported to Japan has so far been rather
small, it being about two million tons a year, which
. is less than 10 per cent of the yearly output of coal
in Japan. The figure is, however, bound to increase
very much in future, because the coal deposits in Japan
are being rapidly exhausted and the growing depth of
pits increases the cost of prcxluction. As for the iron
industry about which the Lytton Report makes a rather
discouraging reference, those who know the actual
conditions entertain no doubt as to its future. Take
the works at Peuchihu, for instance, in which my firm
has the controlling interest, it is supplying Japan with
pig-iron of superior quality, and it is by no means a
losing concern. As for the Anshan Works, it worked
at a loss, as hinted in the Lytton Report, but that was
during the experimental stage, and it is now no
longer losing. With constant improvement in the
method of treatment as well as in market conditions,
there is little room for doubt that the future of these
two basic industries in Manchuria is fairly assured.
As has been officially declared by the Imperial
Government ~ore than once, Japan entertains· no
territorial ambitions in Manchuria. She has given
formal recognition to Manchuria as an independent
state, with a view to assuring it full opportunity for
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growth and organization. Japan has also offered
definite engagement to see that the principle of the
open door and equal opportunity shall be faithfully
carried out. In taking this line of policy Japan was
actuated by a desire to conform to Manchukuo's ardent
aspiration. At the same time Japan hopes thereby to
rescue Manchukuo from the ravages of China's internal
disorders and give it opportunity to attain free development, so that it may be able to play its part in
easening the world's economic difficulty by offering a
very safe and valuable market in the Far East. This
aspect of Japan's policy should have been quite clear
to the Lytton Commission. But unfortunately the
Lytton Report makes an altogether inadequate estimate
of Manchuria's economic value, and entirely fails to do
justice t0 the aforementioned motive of Japan in
recognising Manchukuo. This, I deeply regret to say,
is but one of the instances in which the Report is
unfair.
11. Japan's Anxiety
It cannot be too strongly stated that, notwithstanding the present unfortunate state of things in China
and inspite of recognising Manchukuo, Japan does not
by any means -intend to give up her sincere sympathy
with China and her people. I feel no hesitation in
saying that we yield to no other nation in the world
in the intensity of our wish to see China wake up to
her great position as a self-reliant and progressive
cooperator with us in the maintenance of peace in
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the Far East. The Chinese as a race are essentially
peace-loving, open hearted and tolerant. We know
this historical fact better than any other nation, and
we, consequently, have greater confidence in them
than any other nation. It will, therefore, be easily
understood than Japan harbours no design to quarrel
with China and destroy our natural relationship of
amity with her. It is Japan's sincere wish to restore
her normal relations with China, so that the two great
nations may take their natural positions side by side
in their common effort to promote the economic
development of Eastern Asia. The restoration of
normal relations between them will, however, be dif-ficult so long as the militarist and political leaders in
China persist in devising dangerous policies contrary
to the original character of their people, and so long
-as they stick to revolutionary diplomacy, particularly
-a violent anti-Japanese policy, as a means of attaining
their ends in internal politics. Japan's anxiety; therefore, is that, as soon as improvement in China's
-domestic contentions permits a subsidence of the
violent anti-foreign policy, she may be given op-portunity to offer her effective sympathy to China in
:regard to the task of constructive rehabilitation.

12. Attitude of the League of Nations
The birth of Manchukuo, I am convinced, will offer
-a very favourable stimulus to the restoration of normal
-conditions in China. The bulk of the people who
have taken part in the creation of the new state are
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Chinese, and their success in the work of organising.
a unified country, will not fail to stir up their brethern
in China to emulate their example. Manchukuo's
success will thus be a standing guide-post to the people
of China in prosecuting their great work of national
reconstruction. In this connection it is interesting to
notice that, since Japan's recognition of Manchukuo,
the masses in China, so far from crying for the
recovery of the lost territory, are waiting for an
opportunity to migrate to Manchukuo in search of
better chances for safe and free life, as soon as conditions there settle down. Among the educated classes
also there is an increasing tendency to express a
desire to serve under the Manchukuo Government.
From these and other facts, there is reason to believe
that the masses of people in China do not feel
particular resentiment at the independence of Man~huria. Only among the ruling classes, there are
people who in view of the public stand they have
taken find themselves in an awkward position in
regard to Manchukuo. Facts like these, I am afraid,
may have failed to receive proper appreciation on the
part of the Lytton Commission as the result of their
partiality to the views presented to them by a section
o( the Chinese officials. In any case, I deeply regret
to say that from whatever cause the League and the
Commission are open to the serious charge of failing
to come to an ·impartial judgment as to the realities
of the situation.
In the light of what has been just stated, it seems
the wisest course for the League to reserve judgm~nt

17 on the matter in dispute between Japan and China,
and take definite action only after a full opportunity
of watching and observing the actual development of the
new independent state. As pointed out in the Lytton
Report itself, the situation in the Far East is extremely
complicated, so that it does not easily fit in with the
usual principles of international intercourse. International principles suited for the regulation of situations
like that in the Far East, can only be evolved after
the present dispute shall have been disposed of. The
world may be. said to be now in the process of collecting the necessary data for that purpose. Japan is
fully prepared, in view of the position she rightly
occupies among the nations of the world, to do her
best to support China in her work of unification and
reconstruction, to the end that peace may thereby be
assured in the Far East and services rendered in the
cause of world prosperity. It is to be earnestly hoped
that, in her efforts to do her part in this great work,
Japan will have the benefit of such fair and sympathetic
support as it may be in the League's power to give
in its position as the highest guardian of peace and
progress in the world. Would it be too much to hope
that our expectation in this regard may meet with
the League's favourable consideration ? We feel
confident that the League will prove itself equal to
the important role assigned to it in the present unique
juncture for the good of the human race.
CHOKIURO KAooNO

Tokyo, October, 1932
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